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Remittitur Review: Constitutionality
and Efficiency in Liquidated and
Unliquidated Damage Cases
When a defendant considers a damage award to be excessive
and moves for a new trial on that basis, federal trial court judges
have long exercised the power to issue a remittitur, ordering the
plaintiff either to accept a diminished award or to submit to a new
trial.' Traditionally, neither a remittitur order nor the trial judge's
refusal to issue one was reviewable by an appellate court.
In the last two decades, the power of the federal courts to review
has expanded greatly. Currently, the refusal to order a remittitur or
new trial is reviewable for abuse of discretion in all eleven circuits; 2
the Supreme Court, however, has repeatedly refused explicitly to
acknowledge the legitimacy of appellate review in this area.' Re-
viewability of remittitur orders, typically at the instance of a plain-
tiff who has accepted the remittitur "under protest," is just begin-
ning to gain approval in the federal courts, most notably in the Fifth
Circuit.4 But in this area as well, Supreme Court precedent seems
to be against an extension of the power to review.-
The issue to be explored in this comment is whether and to
what extent remittitur orders and the refusal to issue them should
be reviewable. The first part of the comment sets forth the proce-
dural and historical framework of the problem. The second part
considers the apparent reason for the Supreme Court's reluctance
to sanction reviewability, that is, its fear of infringing on the seventh
amendment prohibition against reexamining facts found by a jury.
Finally, the comment examines the desirability of review from the
standpoint of judicial economy and integrity, concluding that re-
mittitur review, while appropriate in some types of cases, can be
' See, e.g., Blunt v. Little, 3 F. Cas. 760 (No. 1578) (C.C.D. Mass. 1822), were Mr.
Justice Story, sitting on circuit, authorized a remittitur as early as 1822. See also Union Pac.
R.R. v. Hadley, 246 U.S. 330 (1918); Gila Valley G. & N. Ry. v. Hall, 232 U.S. 94 (1914);
Tevis v. Ryan, 233 U.S. 273 (1914); German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Hale, 219 U.S. 307 (1911);
Hansen v. Boyd, 161 U.S. 397 (1896); Clark v. Sidway, 142 U.S. 682 (1892); Arkansas Valley
Land & Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U.S. 69 (1889); Northern Pac. R.R. v. Herbert, 116 U.S. 642
(1886).
2 See cases cited at note 22 infra.
3 E.g., Gruenthal v. Long Island R.R., 393 U.S. 156 (1968); see text and notes at notes
35-44 infra.
E.g., Steinberg v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 364 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1966).
Woodworth v. Chesbrough, 244 U.S. 79, 82 (1917); see Section IA infra.
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clearly unproductive-and perhaps even unconstitutional-in oth-
ers.
I. THE PROCEDURAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Reviewability of Remittitur Orders
The right of a plaintiff to appeal a remittitur order was last
considered by the Supreme Court in 1917, in Woodworth v.
Chesbrough.1 Plaintiff Woodworth, suing the defendant for damages
resulting from violations of the National Bank Act, suffered two
appellate court reversals of favorable jury verdicts on the ground
that the awards were excessive. On the second appeal, the circuit
court gave Woodworth an opportunity to avoid a third trial by con-
senting to remit part of the second jury award. Woodworth con-
sented to the remittitur under protest, solely for the purpose of
obtaining a final judgment from which to appeal. The Supreme
Court, however, frustrated Woodworth's strategy and held that he
could not "retract" his acquiesence in the remittitur. Justice
McKenna, writing for the Court, termed Woodworth's position
"anomalous" in that he had
secured a judgment against Chesbrough and yet [seeks] to
retract the condition upon which it was obtained. This he can-
not do . . . . He encounters, besides, another obstacle: If the
remittitur be disregarded the judgment entered upon it must
be disregarded and the original judgment [awarding a new
trial] restored, which, not being final, cannot be reviewed.7
The Woodworth case thus places the plaintiff in a dilemma: if he
accepts a remittitur, he is not permitted to appeal it, but if he
rejects the remittitur, a new trial order, which is non-final and hence
non-reviewable as well, will be issued.
In applying the general rule that interlocutory orders are not
reviewable, the Court failed to consider the special problems that
arise in situations like Woodworth where, for all practical purposes,
interim orders may become final dispositions. Since at present there
seems to be no limit on the number of times a federal trial judge
may order a new trial because of excessive damages, the practical
effect of making an order directing a new trial unreviewable is to
give the judge the absolute power to force the plaintiff onto a poten-
1 244 U.S. 79 (1917); see Koenigsberger v. Richmond Silver Mining Co., 158 U.S. 41
(1895); cf. Lewis v. Wilson, 151 U.S. 551 (1894); Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22 (1889).
1 Woodworth v. Chesbrough, 244 U.S. 79, 82 (1917).
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tially permanent treadmill, forever winning jury awards only to
have them nullified by the court.
To get off this treadmill, the plaintiff needs a final judgment
from which to appeal;8 consenting to a remittitur under protest
would seem to offer an ideal escape. Yet it was precisely this route
that the Woodworth Court chose to foreclose, finding the "anoma-
lous" nature of the plaintiff's position too formidable an obstacle to
overcome. In terms of traditional procedural concepts, the Court's
position is difficult to understand. Because his consent was neither
voluntary nor a consequence of laches, the plaintiff does not seem
to have waived his right to appeal. And, so long as the plaintiff made
it clear that he was consenting to remittitur only under protest,
explicitly reserving his right to appeal, it would be impossible for
any interested party to show that he had reasonably relied to his
detriment on the plaintiff's acquiescence in the reduced award.
Thus an estoppel theory would also seem inappropriate.9
Despite these difficulties, the Woodworth rule prevailed until
recently in all eleven circuits.10 In 1963, however, the Fifth Circuit
began to waiver in its support of the rule." In Delta Engineering
8 There is no precedent permitting the plaintiff to take an interlocutory appeal of a new
trial order under the Interlocutory Appeals Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970). Appeal under
the Act is discretionary and depends upon the trial judge being willing to characterize the
order as involving "a controlling question of law."
I See Note, Appealability of Judgments Entered Pursuant to Remittiturs in Federal
Courts, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1150, 1156-57 [hereinafter cited as DUKE NoTE]; Comment, Waiver
of Right to Appeal, 39 NEB. L. REv. 739-56 (1960). See also Comment, Civil Proce-
dure-Remittitur-Remitting Parties' Right to Cross-Appeal, 49 N.C.L. REv. 141 (1970).
10 See, e.g., Collum v. Butler, 421 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1970); Movible Offshore Co. v.
Ousley, 346 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1965); S. Birch & Sons v. Martin, 244 F.2d 556 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 837 (1957); Mattox v. News Syndicate Co., 176 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1949);
Bristol Gas & Elec. Co. v. Boy, 261 F. 297 (6th Cir. 1919). Remittitur orders were reviewable,
if at all, only after a final judgment had been entered in a second trial, at which time an
appeal made the entire record reviewable, including interlocutory orders such as the granting
of defendant's motion for new trial after the plaintiff had rejected a conditional remittitur
order. See, e.g., Reinertsen v. George W. Rogers Constr. Corp., 519 F.2d 531 (2d Cir. 1975);
Taylor v. Washington Terminal Co., 409 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 835
(1969).
" Two other circuits have explicitly considered the Fifth Circuit's approach to remittitur
review. The Seventh Circuit rejected it in Collum v. Butler, 421 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1970),
while the Second Circuit postponed its decision to another day in Reinertsen v. George W.
Rogers Constr. Corp., 519 F.2d 531 (2d Cir. 1975).
The Sixth Circuit has taken a different tack, holding that, under Erie, state practice on
remittitur review must be applied to federal diversity cases. See Mooney v. Henderson Por-
tion Pack Co., 334 F.2d 7 (6th Cir. 1964), followed in Burnett v. Coleman Co., 507 F.2d 726
(6th Cir. 1974); Brewer v. Uniroyal, Inc., 498 F.2d 973 (6th Cir. 1974); Manning v. Altec, Inc.,
488 F.2d 127 (6th Cir. 1973). In Mooney, the court based its result on the "outcome determina-
tion" test of Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), reasoning that since a litigant
could obtain review of a remittitur accepted under protest in the state court, this opportunity
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Corp. v. Scott,'2 the court assumed without deciding that it was
possible for plaintiffs to challenge remittitur orders, so long as they
had not "actually obtained the fruits of a judgment."'13 Finding no
abuse of discretion in the trial judge's remittitur order in the case
before it, the court declined to reach the issue of power to review; it
did, however, note that "it would be a strange rule that would keep
a plaintiff from challenging the legal correctness of any action hav-
ing such portentous consequences."' 4
Three years later in Steinberg v. Indemnity Insurance Co., ' 5 the
Fifth Circuit found that the trial court had abused its discretion in
ordering a remittitur. The plaintiff in that case had first attempted
to skirt the waiver issue by appealing the remittitur order itself,
without accepting or rejecting it. The Fifth Circuit initially refused
to review on the ground that the order remained interlocutory.
When, however, the plaintiff accepted the remittitur conditionally
as a means to appeal, the court found that she had "suffered a
sufficiently adverse adjudication to allow an appeal." They added
that "[m]oreover, plaintiff has not collected the judgment as re-
duced."1 7
The Fifth Circuit did not cite Woodworth in either Delta
Engineering or Steinberg. One might argue that both cases differed
from Woodworth in that the plaintiffs in those cases had not "en-
joyed the fruits" of remittitur, that is, had not actually collected the
must also be made available in the federal court. The Seventh Circuit rejected this reasoning
in Dorin v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 382 F.2d 73 (7th Cir. 1967), holding that the
outcome determination test could not be used without reference to the criteria set forth in
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). Finding that a difference in remittitur procedure,
which comes into play only after a full trial has been held, would not encourage forum-
shopping or result in inequitable administration of the laws, the Seventh Circuit refused to
hold the federal courts bound to state procedure in this regard. Cf. Reinertsen v. George W.
Rogers Constr. Corp., 519 F.2d 531, 534 (2d Cir. 1975). See also DUKE NoTE, supra note 9, at
1151-55.
Even apart from normal Erie considerations, it would seem improper to utilize state
remittitur procedure in the federal courts. As will be argued below, the legitimacy of both
remittitur and remittitur review is bound up with seventh amendment considerations. Since
the seventh amendment does not apply to state court procedure, Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U.S.
294 (1877), transference of state remittitur principles to the federal court could be unconstitu-
tional in some respects. Furthermore, in diversity cases where federal courts apply state
substantive law the seventh amendment nonetheless applies. Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores,
Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 359-60 (1962); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Cooperative,
356 U.S. 525, 538-39 (1958).
12 322 F.2d 11 (1963).
11 Id. at 15.
1, Id.
" 364 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1966).
Id. at 267 (noting unpublished order).
'7 Id. at 268.
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reduced judgments they sought to overturn, whereas Woodworth
apparently had. But in United States v. 1160. 96 Acres of Land, 18 the
court was presented with a case in which even this tenuous distinc-
tion could not be made, since the plaintiffs had collected the re-
duced judgment and had still appealed the remittitur. And, this
time, the defendants' protest that plaintiffs had waived their right
to appeal was based squarely on Woodworth.
In response to this challenge, the Fifth Circuit attempted to
draw a different distinction:
But Woodworth implies that the judgment creditor has a real
choice between taking a sure sum and putting the case to an-
other trial and that the only detriment suffered is the risk that
on the conditionally ordered retrial, the recovery will be even
less than the reduced amount of the remittitur. 1
The suggestion here is that a plaintiff can appeal a remittitur
order only when he did not freely choose to accept it. This distinc-
tion also appears untenable. So long as there is no limit to the
number of retrials that may be ordered, it would seem that a plain-
tiff never has a real choice in a remittitur situation. Sooner or later,
even the most determined plaintiff will have to get off the retrial
treadmill, and the only way to do so is to consent to a remittitur or
to its non-judicial equivalent, a settlement. In this sense, all remitti-
turs involve a forced instead of a free choice; indeed, the whole
rationale behind the remittitur procedure is to pressure the plaintiff
into taking less than that which a jury has awarded him.
The Fifth Circuit did not, however, rely heavily on this distinc-
tion. A few paragraphs later the court went on to conclude that "the
right to maintain the appeal turns on whether the remittitur is
accepted without protest. '20 Thus the court implicitly recognized
that its case, though not its result, was identical to Woodworth.21 As
Is 432 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1970).
" Id. at 912 (emphasis added).
20 Id.
21 In the DUKE NOTE, supra note 9, at 1159, it is argued that the Supreme Court has
perhaps tacitly shifted its position on the remittitur question since Woodworth. Banks v.
Chicago Grain Trimmers Ass'n, 390 U.S. 459 (1968), is cited as evidence of this change; that
case, however, dealt with the wholly unrelated issue of whether acceptance of a remittitur
constitutes a "compromise" with an injurer that discharges an employer from liability under
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act. Id. at 466-67. The Duke Note
also argues that the Court's obvious uneasiness with remittitur in Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S.
474 (1935), could be cured by the expansion of remittitur review. As this comment will argue,




noted above, under traditional procedural principles, the Fifth
Circuit's position would appear to be more logical than that taken
by the Supreme Court; yet it is impossible to choose between these
two rules on procedural grounds alone. Rather, constitutional and
policy considerations, not raised in the Woodworth opinion, must be
taken into account. Before proceeding with that discussion, how-
ever, the other side of the reviewability problem-the defendant's
attempt to gain review of a refusal to order a remittitur-must be
explored.
B. Reviewability of the Refusal to Order a Remittitur
Problems of finality and waiver do not arise when a trial court
refuses the defendant's request to disturb a jury award on the
grounds that it is excessive. A dissatisfied defendant in such a case
has the opportunity of appealing a final judgment to which he has
not consented. Thus, the Woodworth rule presents no obstacle to
appellate review of the refusal to order remittitur or retrial.22 There
is, however, another, more general federal rule that, in the past,
operated to bar defendants as well as plaintiffs from seeking appel-
late review of trial court decisions on such matters.
In Fairmount Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co.,23 Justice
2 This fact may help explain why the Fifth Circuit joined its sister circuits in allowing
review of the failure to issue remittiturs long before it decided to move beyond the other
circuits by also reviewing the issuance of such orders. See Whiteman v. Pitrie, 220 F.2d 914
(5th Cir. 1955). The other cases include Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Kirtley, 307 F.2d 418
(8th Cir. 1962); Dagnello v. Long Island R.R., 297 F.2d 797 (2d Cir. 1961); Ballard v. Forbes,
208 F.2d 883 (1st Cir. 1954); Bucher v. Krause, 200 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1952); Trowbridge v.
Abrasive Co. of Philadelphia, 190 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1951); Smith v. Welch, 189 F.2d 832 (10th
Cir. 1951); Sebring Trucking Co. v. White, 187 F.2d 486 (6th Cir. 1951); Boyle v. Bond, 187
F.2d 362 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Virginia Ry. v. Armentrout, 166 F.2d 400 (4th Cir. 1948); Cobb v.
Lepisto, 6 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1925).
In taking this further step the Fifth Circuit may well have been influenced by considera-
tions of equity between classes of litigants. No matter which party complains, the fact issue
in dispute is always the same: the appropriateness of a jury award. It can thus be argued that,
since defendants are permitted to challenge the refusal to issue remittitur orders, plaintiffs
should have a similar right when the orders are issued against them.
287 U.S. 474 (1933). This case presented a somewhat unusual set of facts. In a diversity
action the defendant had won two jury verdicts, both overturned by the appellate court. The
tenacious plaintiff was finally victorious in the third trial, but the jury assessed damages of
only one dollar. The appellate court reversed again, holding that the verdict was a determina-
tion of liability and that clearly inadequate damages had been awarded since the plaintiff
was entitled to at least $18,250. The Supreme Court reversed again and reinstated the jury
verdict, holding that the damage award was not reviewable on grounds of inadequacy. See
also Southern Ry. v. Bennett, 233 U.S. 80, 87 (1914); Metropolitan R.R. v. Moor, 121 U.S.
558, 574-75 (1887). It should be noted that the following discussion, while framed for the sake
of clarity in terms of the defendant's dissatisfaction with an excessive award, also applies to
a plaintiff's dissatisfaction with an inadequate award. The same could not be said of the
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Brandeis described this rule as a prohibition against review of trial
court decisions granting or denying motions for new trials when
matters of fact were in dispute and noted that it was frequently
applied where the issue was whether the damage award was exces-
sive or inadequate. "Settled by a long and unbroken line of deci-
sions, '24 the rule had traditionally been supported by reference to
two different policies. First was the prohibition of section 22 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 on appellate court reversals based on errors
of fact; this explicit restriction of judicial power could also be
"rested on that part of the Seventh Amendment which provides that
'no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any court
of the United States, than according to the rules of the common
law.' ",25 A second reason which, according to Justice Brandeis, was
more frequently cited was that the decision on the appropriateness
of the jury award was a matter committed to the discretion of the
trial judge.
Since Fairmount Glass, the trial court's discretion in many
matters has become subject to the ever-widening scrutiny of appel-
late court review.26 But the constitutional constraints on judicial
power to review facts determined by a jury remain. The precise
limits of those constraints is the subject of a long-standing debate, 27
carried on at two levels, one primarily historical, the other based on
policy considerations. On the first level the question is whether and
to what extent eighteenth century common law rules were explicitly
incorporated in the seventh amendment. On the second level the
question is what safeguards are necessary to preserve the integrity
of the jury's fact-finding process and thus to secure the constitu-
tional right to jury trial.
Professor Hinton, commenting in 1933 on the Fairmount case,
challenged Brandeis's opinion on the first level. 28 While conceding
that under the English common law a litigant would not have been
entitled to review of a decision refusing a new trial because of an
preceding section since the unconstitutionality of additur in the federal courts keeps the
defendant from ending up in a similar dilemma.
24 Fairmount Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 287 U.S. 474, 481 (1933).
2 Id. at 482.
2' Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REv. 751 (1957).
27 The most recent opponents in the debate are Professor Moore, who supports an ex-
panded power of appellate review, and Professor Wright, who prefers the more traditional
approach. See, e.g., 3 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1302.1,
at 346, § 1305.1, at 376 (C. Wright ed. 1958); J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 59.05[3],
59.08[6], 59.15[11,[3] (2d ed. 1966); Wright, supra note 26.
28 Hinton, Power of Federal Appellate Courts to Review Ruling on Motion for New Trial,
1 U. CHI. L. REv. 111 (1933).
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excessive or inadequate jury award, Hinton argued that the English
practice should be disregarded in determining the scope of reviewa-
bility in the federal courts. Under English law, a litigant's applica-
tion for retrial was heard by a bench of four judges, thus obviating,
or at least lessening, the need for intervention by a reviewing court.
By retaining the prohibition on review in the absence of the safe-
guard of a court en banc, Hinton argued that the Fairmount Court
had showed itself "[ulnable to escape the 'dead hand' of the com-
mon law."29
On the second level, Professor William Wirt Blume"0 argued
that review of a trial court decision granting or denying a new trial
is not contrary to the seventh amendment because "the appellate
court is reviewing only the decision of the judge-not the verdict of
the jury." He insisted that reexamining the facts tried by the jury
"for the purpose of reviewing the decision of the judge" is not forbid-
den by the seventh amendment.3'
Recently, Judge Skelly Wright addressed the same issue in an
opinion dealing with the proper scope of appellate review of
remittitur orders.32 He noted that the traditional prohibition on re-
view of new trial determinations stems not only from respect for the
trial judge's "unique opportunity to consider the evidence in the
living courtroom context," but also from the deference due "the
agency to whom the Constitution allocates the fact-finding function
in the first instance-the jury. ' 33 At least in instances where judge
and jury agree, Judge Wright saw little justification for appellate
court interference with the result. Despite such considerations, all
eleven circuits have now adopted the position advocated by Profes-
sors Hinton, Blume, and more recently, Professor Moore; all now
hold that the appellate court does have the power to review a trial
court's denial of a motion for a new trial on the grounds of inade-
quate or excessive damages for an abuse of discretion.34
In so holding, the courts of appeal have had little Supreme
Court encouragement. In the Fairmount case Justice Brandeis pro-
vided only a slight opening for reviewability when he explicitly re-
" Id.
3Blume, Review of Facts in Jury Cases-The Seventh Amendment, 20 Am. JUD. SOC'Y
130 (1936).
1' Id. at 131. See also Pound, Principles of Practice Reform, 71 CENT. L.J. 221 (1910),
cited by Blume, supra note 30, at 131.
32 Taylor v. Washington Terminal Co., 409 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
835 (1969).
Id. at 148.
4 See cases cited at note 22 supra.
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fused to foreclose the possibility that review of an order granting or
denying a motion for a new trial where issues of fact are involved
might be appropriate in some other case in the future.3 5 The Court's
next statement on the subject after Fairmount was almost an after-
thought. In Affolder v. New York C. & St. L. R.R., 36 Justice Clark
spent four pages discussing the propriety of jury instructions regard-
ing liability. The fact that the trial court also happened to have
reduced the plaintiff's award by a remittitur seems to have been
viewed by all the participants as incidental to the case, and Justice
Clark tossed off what may be an equally incidental, perhaps even
offhand remark at the end of the opinion, stating that "the damages
awarded by the District Court's judgment is [sic] not monstrous
in the circumstances of this case. '37
While this statement might seem tacitly to approve appellate
court review of orders denying new trials, the Supreme Court soon
made it clear that it was still not prepared to jettison explicitly the
traditional rule barring such review. In Neese v. Southern Ry., 38 a
per curiam opinion citing neither Fairmount nor Affolder, the
Court, in overturning a Fourth Circuit reversal of a district court's
remittitur order, commented only as follows: "Even assuming such
appellate power to exist under the Seventh Amendment, we find
that the Court of Appeals was not justified, on this record, in regard-
ing the denial of a new trial, upon a remittitur of part of the verdict,
as an abuse of discretion." 9
More recently, in Grunenthal v. Long Island R.R.,40 the Court
reversed a Second Circuit finding of an abuse of discretion in the
refusal to order a remittitur or retrial in an FELA case. The Court
thus reinstated a trial court decision to allow a jury verdict to re-
main undisturbed, just as it had done in Fairmount and in Neese,
and, once again, it explicitly refused to rule on whether appellate
courts have the power to review such orders or are, as the plaintiff
contended, precluded from doing so by the seventh amendment.
Instead, Justice Brennan said:
We have no occasion in this case to consider that argument, for
assuming, without deciding, that the Court of Appeals was
empowered to review the denial and invoked the correct stan-
" Fairmount Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 287 U.S. 474, 485 (1933).
36 339 U.S. 96 (1950).
31 Id. at 101.
39 350 U.S. 77 (1955).
39 Id.
4- 393 U.S. 156 (1968).
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dard of review, the action of the trial judge, as we view the
evidence, should not have been disturbed. 41
Despite its reiteration of the "assuming without deciding" formula,
the Grunenthal Court did treat this case in a new way. Unlike the
Fairmount and Neese Courts, the Grunenthal Court made a de-
tailed appraisal of the evidence bearing on damages, finding that
the $150,000 that the jury had apparently awarded for pain and
suffering was not "without support in the record."4 2
It is unclear what conclusions, if any, may be drawn from this
unusual, detailed consideration by the Supreme Court of the worth
of pain and suffering, or from its holding that the appellate court's
attempt to set a limit on that value was wrong. In his dissent,
Justice Harlan concluded that such matters were not suitable ones
for the Court to resolve and that certiorari should have been dis-
missed as improvidently granted. 3 Justice Stewart, in a separate
dissent, expressed impatience with the majority's continued use of
the "assuming without deciding" language and argued that by pro-
ceeding to review the district judge's order in the case, the Court
had, in effect, decided that "nothing in the Seventh Amendment
. . . precludes appellate review of the trial judge's denial of a mo-
tion to set aside an award as excessive. 44
After four decades of "assuming without deciding" it seems
reasonable to conclude, as the Second Circuit did in Dagnello v.
Long Island R.R., 45 that the Court's continuing concern for the sev-
enth amendment is the central factor in its hesitancy to rule deci-
sively on the question of the reviewability of orders denying motions
for new trials. Moreover, this problem may well include not only the
constitutionality of review but also the constitutionality of remitti-
tur itself. In all three cases on this issue that the Supreme Court has
chosen to review, the damage issue was complicated by the presence
of an unliquidated damage element for which there was no clear rule
of law.4" As this comment will argue below,47 these are precisely the
cases in which remittitur is on its shakiest constitutional basis.
Id. at 158.
42 Id. at 161.
" Id. at 163.
, Id. at 164.
5 289 F.2d 797 (2d Cir. 1961).
" Aflolder, Neese, and Grunenthal were all personal injury cases.
' See text and notes at notes 64-70 infra.
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I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION: FACT DETERMINATION
AND THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT
A. Dimick v. Schiedt
The Supreme Court has never ruled directly on the constitu-
tionality of remittitur in the federal courts. In Dimick v. Schiedt,45
however, the Court held additur (in which the judge offers the de-
fendant a choice between a new trial and the payment of a larger
damage award) to be an unconstitutional practice, in violation of
the seventh amendment.49 But in so holding Justice Sutherland,
writing for the majority, seems to many to have implicitly sanc-
tioned the well-established practice of remittitur-even though the
propriety of that practice was not at issue in the case." One para-
graph in particular has been quoted again and again by proponents
of unlimited remittitur:
Where the verdict is excessive, the practice of substituting a
remission of the excess for a new trial is not without plausible
support in the view that what remains is included in the verdict
along with the unlawful excess,-in that sense that it has been
found by the jury,-and that the remittitur has the effect of
merely lopping off an excrescence. But where the verdict is too
small, an increase by the court is a bald addition of something
which in no sense can be said to be included in the verdict.5 '
Shorn of its context, this quotation can and often has been
interpreted to mean that Justice Sutherland was firmly convinced
of the constitutionality of remittitur and equally firmly convinced
of the unconstitutionality of additur, all on the basis of an arbitrary
distinction between two practices indistinguishable except insofar
as one involves discretionary subtraction and the other discretion-
ary addition. Within the context of the rest of the opinion, however,
it is less than an unqualified endorsement of remittitur.
4' 293 U.S. 474 (1935).
4, For a more detailed discussion of the special problems relevant to additur, see Wilson,
The Motion for New Trial Based on Inadequacy of Damages Awarded, 39 NEB. L. REV. 694
(1960).
50 See, e.g., Jehl v. Southern Pac. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 821, 427 P.2d 988, 59 Cal. Rptr. 276
(1967), overruling Dorsey v. Barba, 38 Cal. 2d 530, 240 P.2d 604 (1952). See also James,
Remedies for Excessiveness or Inadequacy of Verdicts: New Trial on Some or All Issues,
Remmititur and Additur, 1 DUQUESNE U.L. REV. 143 (1963); Comment, Statutory Authoriza-
tion of Additur and Remittur, 43 Miss. L.J. 107 (1972); Note, Civil Procedure-Power of Trial
Court to Grant Additur, 40 TENN. L. REV. 753 (1973); Note, Appealability of Rulings on
Motion for New Trial in the Federal Courts, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 575 (1950); Comment,
Correction of Damage Verdicts by Remittitur and Additur, 44 YALE L.J. 318 (1934).
" Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935).
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Justice Sutherland expressed grave doubts about the constitu-
tionality of both remittitur and additur but was reluctant to view
the former as unconstitutional because there seemed to be a consid-
erable amount of precedent behind it, as contrasted with the mini-
mal support for additurr2 Justice Sutherland cited six cases in
which the Supreme Court appeared to have sanctioned remittitur.53
Besides Supreme Court precedent, however, he also had to consider
"the rules of the common law" as of 1791, which are explicitly
incorporated by the seventh amendment.
In canvassing the English precedents, Justice Sutherland found
that the practice of remittitur had been "condemned as opposed to
the principles of the common law by every reasoned English deci-
sion, both before and after the adoption of the Federal Constitution
... ,, Nonetheless, he was unable to overcome his reluctance to
do what he thought would be necessary to bring American practice
into accord with the common law of 1791: overrule all of the Su-
preme Court and lower court cases that seemed to approve the
practice. Accordingly, he made an uneasy compromise, declaring
additur unconstitutional but giving remittitur his begrudging ap-
proval.
In his much-quoted dissent in Dimick, Justice Stone ridiculed
Justice Sutherland's struggle to deal with the common law prior to
1791 as an attempt "to perpetuate in changeless form the minutiae
of trial practice as it existed in the English courts in 1791." 5 Profes-
sor Edith Henderson more recently derided similar attempts on the
5, [lIt, therefore, may be that if the question of remittitur were now before us for
the first time, it would be decided otherwise. But, first announced by Mr. Justice Story
in 1822, the doctrine has been accepted as the law for more than a hundred years and
uniformly applied in the federal courts during that time. And, as it finds some support
in the practice of the English courts prior to the adoption of the Constitution, we may
assume that in a case involving a remittitur, which this case does not, the doctrine would
not be reconsidered or disturbed at this late day.
Nevertheless, this court in a very special sense is charged with the duty of construing
and upholding the Constitution; and in the discharge of that important duty, it ever
must be alert to see that a doubtful precedent be not extended by mere analogy to a
different case if the result will be to weaken or subvert what it conceives to be a principle
of the fundamental law of the land.
Id. at 484-85.
-" Justice Story initially authorized the practice of remittitur while sitting on circuit.
Blunt v. Little, 3 F. Cas. 760 (No. 1578) (C.C.D. Mass. 1822).
The six cases are: Gila Valley G. & N. Ry. v. Hall, 232 U.S. 94 (1914); German Alliance
Ins. Co. v. Hale, 219 U.S. 307 (1911); Koenigsberger v. Richmond Silver Mining Co., 158 U.S.
41, 52 (1895); Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22 (1889); Arkansas Valley Land & Cattle Co. v.
Mann, 130 U.S. 69 (1889); Northern Pac. R.R. v. Herbert, 116 U.S. 642 (1886).
" Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 484 (1935).
Id. at 490.
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grounds that "the amendment was not intended to codify a rigid
form of jury practice-that indeed there was no consistent practice
in 1790 to be codified."
S
Whether or not there was a consistent practice in the eighteenth
century should be, for all practical purposes, irrelevant. The impor-
tant point would seem to be whether there was a consistent principle
behind the multiplicity of practices. Justice Sutherland concluded
that there was and expressed it in the following manner:
The controlling distinction between the power of the court and
that of the jury is that the former is the power to determine the
law and the latter to determine the facts. In dealing with ques-
tions like the one now under consideration, that distinction
must be borne steadily in mind.5 7
A wide variety of federal trial court practices may be consistent with
this overriding principle; a few, like the issuance of remittitur orders
in some types of cases, may not be.18 That, at any rate, seems to be
the essence of the problem, and proponents of unlimited remittitur
have generally failed to meet it squarely on the merits.
Instead of arguing on the basis of seventh amendment princi-
ples, proponents of unlimited remittitur have focused on its advan-
tages in terms of efficiency, stressing the growing need for a means
of expediting the work of the federal courts.59 In addition, they have
argued that any trial court abuses of the remittitur procedure could
be corrected through liberalized provisions for appellate review.
However persuasive these arguments may be," the constitutional
question remains; unfortunately, the proponents of unlimited re-
mittitur and expanded remittitur review have not dealt as convinc-
ingly with this issue.
Justice Stone's argument in Dimick in support of unlimited
remittitur is perhaps typical: he stated that the seventh amendment
"is concerned with substance and not with form" and guarantees
only "the essentials" of trial by jury. 1 Consequently, there is no
need for a "search of the legal scrap heap of a century and a half
51 Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REv. 289, 337
(1966).
" Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935).
" See text and notes at notes 64-70 infra.
" E.g., Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474,489 (Stone, J., dissenting); Jehl v. Southern Pac.
Co., 66 Cal. 2d 821, 427 P.2d 988, 59 Cal. Rptr. 276 (1967) (Traynor, J.).
1o In some instances this argument may be singularly unpersuasive. See text at notes 84-
86 infra.
S Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 490 (1935).
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ago" 2 and no inconsistency in allowing judges to correct jury dam-
age awards when they are outside "the legal limits of a proper ver-
dict."63
There are substantial problems with this argument. It would
seem that in a civil case a jury determination of the quantum of
damages is the very essence or substance of the right to trial by jury.
If this is so, then the whole argument turns on the "legal limits of a
proper verdict" notion, and the problem becomes one of deciding
how a judge may determine what those limits are, when they have
been exceeded, and by how much. Justice Stone argued forcefully
that judges can and should be allowed to perform this task, but he
did not explain how they should do so, even though the case before
him presented that question in its most acute form by virtue of the
fact that it was a personal injury case involving the assessment of
the worth of pain and suffering.
In the years since Dimick, the practice of remittitur in such
cases has posed particularly difficult problems for the federal judici-
ary. Section EEI of this comment will focus on the adequacy of the
federal courts' response. Before going on to that topic, however, the
comment examines some of the English principles and American
precedents referred to in Dimick, to see whether they might not offer
more guidance in determining the propriety of remittitur than was
at first apparent.
B. English Principles and American Precedent Reconsidered: A
Possible Reconciliation
In Dimick, as in American cases and commentaries generally,
with a few notable exceptions, 4 remittitur tends to be treated as a
unitary concept, as if it were necessary to accept the practice in all
cases where it might be applied or to reject it totally. The English
sources cited by Justice Sutherland give quite a different impres-
sion, drawing a sharp distinction between cases involving liquidated
damages and those involving unliquidated claims. For example,
Mayne's Treatise on Damages was quoted as stating that "it was
always admitted 'that in cases where the amount of damages was
uncertain their assessment was a matter so peculiarly within the
province of the jury that the Court should not alter it.' ",5
" Id. at 495.
" Id. at 492.
" Carlin, Remittiturs and Additurs, 49 W. VA. L.Q. 1 (1942); Wright, supra note 26, at
752.
" Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 479-80 (1935). See also J. MAYNE, TREATISE ON
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This frequently ignored distinction seems peculiarly relevant to
the conflict Justice Sutherland perceived between principle and
precedent in American law because it parallels the distinction be-
tween disputed facts, which it is the right and duty of the jury to
determine, and undisputed facts, which neither judge nor jury is at
liberty to disregard. Thus, it seems perfectly consistent with the
seventh amendment to allow the federal judiciary to correct jury
verdicts that fly in the face of undisputed facts; it does not seem
consistent to allow the discretionary substitution of judicial conclu-
sions about disputed facts for jury conclusions about such facts. The
logic of this position would allow the continuance of the practice of
remittitur but would limit its scope to cases involving liquidated
damages and/or to cases where some clear rule of law applies. By
thus limiting the scope of remittitur, it would seem possible to re-
tain whatever efficiency advantages the practice offers without in
any way curtailing rights guaranteed by the seventh amendment.
Moreover, such a distinction would not necessitate the overrul-
ing of the many early Supreme Court cases that seem to authorize
remittitur 6 Of the eight cases noted above,87 four involved review
of state or territorial law claims decided by state or territorial
courts 8 and would thus seem to pose no problem, since the seventh
amendment is binding only on the federal courts. The other four
cases cited all involved federal court remittitur orders, but two of
them were issued in property cases" and the other two in contract
cases,70 areas where damages are frequently liquidated and where
there are reasonably clear rules of law regarding the determination
of unliquidated damages. Not one of these cases involved the issu-
ance of remittitur orders by a federal court in a personal injury case
or in any other type of unliquidated damage case in which no clear
rule of law applies.
To this point at least there have been no limitations imposed
DAMAGES 571 (9th ed. 1920) (1st ed. 1856); J. SAYER, LAW OF DAMAGES 177 (1790); Beardmore
v. Carrington, 2 Wils. K.B. 244, 95 Eng. Rep. 790 (K.B. 1764).
66 Limiting remittitur in this way would, however, necessitate overruling many lower
court decisions. Justice Sutherland noted that remittitur "has been uniformly practiced by
the lower federal courts." 293 U.S. at 483.
67 See note 1 supra.
66 Union Pac. R.R. v. Hadley, 246 U.S. 330 (1918); Gila Valley G. & N. Ry. v. Hall, 232
U.S. 94 (1914); Tevis v. Ryan, 233 U.S. 273 (1914); Northern Pac. R.R. v. Herbert, 116 U.S.
642 (1886).
11 Arkansas Valley Land & Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U.S. 397 (1896); Clark v. Sidway,
142 U.S. 682 (1892).




on the types of cases in which remittitur is appropriate; concern
about such unrestricted use of remittitur has perhaps accelerated
the trend toward expanded appellate review. This trend has, in
turn, forced appellate courts to struggle to develop standards ap-
plicable to the practice of remittitur in all types of cases. A consider-
ation of those standards and of the problems in applying them to
unliquidated damage cases where no clear rules of law apply follows.
II. STANDARDS FOR REVIEW
A. The Purposes of Review
The main rationale for remittitur is the promotion of efficiency.
Yet those who support the practice on this basis clearly do not wish
to compromise justice in the interest of efficiency. For that reason,
many of the strongest proponents of remittitur also favor making
trial court remittitur decisions reviewable. 7' In this way, they hope
to decrease the danger that arbitrary or ill-considered action by a
single judge, amounting to an abuse of his discretion, will remain
uncorrected.
One may hope, moreover, that allowing review will serve to
improve justice by increasing consistency across cases litigated in
different trial courts, in accord with the ideal that like cases should
be treated alike. Still a third argument favoring review is the hope
that it will serve as a check on the ever-present danger of
infringement on seventh amendment rights. Even though propo-
nents of unlimited remittitur may at times downgrade the import-
ance of the seventh amendment argument, none favor allowing the
substitution of a judicial opinion for a jury opinion on a matter of
disputed fact over which reasonable men might disagree merely
because a jury's answer is at variance with a judge's personal calcu-
lations.
The assumption underlying all these arguments is that the ap-
pellate courts are capable of fashioning a workable standard for
testing the trial judge's exercise of discretion-remittitur review
cannot be an efficient process unless the reviewing court can con-
struct a yardstick for determining when an award is excessive and
for calculating the amount of that excess. The difficulty of this task
varies from case to case. Where damages are liquidated, as they
often are in cases involving property damage, no insuperable obsta-
7, Justice Stone, for example, favored liberalized review. See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S.
474, 489 (1935). See also Jehl v. Southern Pac. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 821, 427 P.2d 988, 59 Cal. Rptr.
276 (1967) (Justice Traynor's remarks).
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cles are likely to present themselves. Even when dealing with unli-
quidated damage cases of certain types, for example, those that
frequently arise in contract actions, the problem can usually be
resolved by reference to a body of rules evolved out of long experi-
ence.72 Admittedly, the application of these rules does not often
result in a single correct numerical answer, but the process will
normally allow one to establish a correct numerical range for each
case, a range with a reasonably clear upper and lower limit. In
unliquidated damage cases where no clear rule of law applies, the
problem is much more difficult; these difficulties occur in their most
acute form in personal injury cases where the defendant and, per-
haps also the trial judge, feels that the jury has responded over-
generously to the plaintiff's pain and suffering.
The following section will detail the Fifth Circuit's handling of
the problem of setting standards for review. Then the focus will shift
to an analysis of problems left unresolved by the Fifth Circuit's
approach, as illustrated by a particular case: Gorsalitz v. Olin Ma-
thieson Chemical Corp.73
B. The Maximum Recovery Rule
In its first encounter with the Gorsaltiz case in 1970, the Fifth
Circuit worked out the basics of its approach to the problem of
standards for remittitur review, an approach which it has since
followed in a number of other cases.74 The court held that two ques-
tions may properly be the subject of review: first, whether the trial
court erred in requiring or failing to require any remittitur at all,
and, second, assuming that the trial court was correct in requiring
some remittitur, whether it erred in determining the amount to be
remitted. 75
In answering both questions, the Fifth Circuit has had recourse
to a single standard: the maximum recovery rule. Under this stan-
dard remittitur is proper only when a jury exceeds the maximum
amount it might reasonably have awarded; the amount to be remit-
ted is proper only insofar as it reduces a jury award to that maxi-
mum figure. The underlying theory here is that the jury, by its
72 See, e.g., Glazer v. Glazer, 278 F. Supp. 476 (E.D. La. 1968).
11 Gorsalitz v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 429 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1970), and the
rehearing of that case 456 F.2d 180 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 921 (1972).
7, See, e.g., Bonura v. Sea Land Serv. Inc., 505 F.2d 665 (5th Cir. 1974); Jenkins v.
Aquatic Contractors & Eng'rs, 446 F.2d 520, 522 (5th Cir. 1971).
11 429 F.2d at 1046.
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excessive verdict, intended to award the maximum allowable, and
the defendant therefore has no legitimate grounds to complain
against any verdict within the allowable limits.
In making this choice, the Fifth Circuit rejected two competing
standards accepted by several state courts. One of these standards
requires reduction of an excessive verdict to the minimum amount
that the jury might have awarded, on the theory that an award of
any greater sum deprives the defendant of his right to a retrial."6 The
other standard allows the judge to reduce the verdict to whatever
amount the court itself feels the jury should have awarded." In
explaining why it rejected these two possibilities and chose the max-
imum recovery standard instead, the Gorsalitz court quoted Profes-
sor Wright to the effect that this is "the only theory which has any
reasonable claim of being consistent with the Seventh Amend-
ment.","
Agreement on the use of the maximum recovery standard is
widespread and growing, at least in the federal courts; 9 in the ab-
stract, it seems a satisfactory one. Problems emerge, however, when
the practical question of how the maximum is to be determined is
raised. In a contract case like Glazer v. Glazer,"° the application of
reasonably clear rules of law establishes the numerical range appro-
priate to the facts of the case, and the maximum recovery rule
makes it apparent that the correct figure is the one at the top of the
range. But in a personal injury case like Gorsalitz, establishing a
" See, e.g., Meissner v. Pupas, 35 F. Supp. 676, (E.D. Wis. 1940), afl'd, 124 F.2d 720
(7th Cir. 1941); Swanson v. Schultz, 223 Wis. 278, 284, 270 N.W. 43, 45 (1936); Reykdal v.
Miller, 216 Wis. 561, 257 N.W. 604 (1934); 270 N.W. 43, 45 (1936); Lehner v. Kelley, 215 Wis.
265, 254 N.W. 634 (1934).
" See, e.g., Jehl v. Southern Pac. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 821, 832-33, 427 P.2d 988, 995, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 276, 283 (1967). Justice Traynor, after concluding that "[tihere is no essential differ-
ence between the procedures appropriate for remittitur and additur, and we may therefore
look to remittitur cases to determine the proper procedure for additur," continues as follows:
If the court decides to order an additur, it should set the amount that it determines from
the evidence to be fair and reasonable. In this respect it should exercise its completely
independent judgment. It need not fix . . . the minimum or maximum amount that
would be supported by substantial evidence and therefore sustainable on appeal.
Justice Traynor, it should be noted, was interpreting the right-to-jury trial provision of the
California constitution, which, he observed, differs substantially from the seventh amend-
ment in the United States Constitution. See also 6A J. MOORE, supra note 27, 59.05[3],
at 59-57, 59-58 (2d ed. 1973).
,' Gorsalitz v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 429 F.2d 1033, 1046-47 (5th Cir. 1970),
quoting 3 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, supra note 27, § 1305.1, at 276 (C. Wright ed. 1958).
See also F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 326 (1965) (who comments that any other practice "seems
to be a clear invasion of the jury's sphere.").
" See, e.g., Manning v. Altec, Inc., 488 F.2d 127 (6th Cir. 1973); Taylor v. Washington
Terminal Co., 409 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 835 (1969).
11 278 F. Supp. 476 (E.D. La. 1968).
19761
The University of Chicago Law Review
proper range for the worth of pain and suffering is necessarily a
difficult undertaking in which vague feelings are often relied upon
in place of numerical calculations. For example, in Gorsalitz the
court makes reference to cases in which the "verdict is so unreason-
ably high as to result in a miscarriage of justice" and to verdicts
that are "so inordinately large as obviously to exceed the maximum
limit of a reasonable range within which the jury may properly
operate."81 Other courts have tried to describe the amount that
exceeds the allowable maximum by talking about verdicts that are
"gross," "monstrous," "outrageous," and/or "shocking to the con-
science of the court. '82
It is questionable whether an actual measuring rod can be con-
structed for the latter type of cases; it may be that judicial correc-
tions of jury awards in this area can only reflect the personal pre-
dictions of particular judges or groups of judges.83 Looking solely at
the judges' statements, one searches in vain for straight-forward
accounts of what they are doing. However, close analysis of the
actual computation of amounts in these cases suggests that there
" Gorsalitz v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 429 F.2d 1033, 1046 (5th Cir. 1970).
82 One or more of these words and phrases have been used in the following illustrative
but not exhaustive list of cases: Century "21" Shows v. Owens, 400 F.2d 603 (8th Cir. 1968);
Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Abbott, 287 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1961); Russell v. Monon-
gahela Ry., 262 F.2d 349, 352 (3d Cir. 1958); Ballard v. Forbes, 208 F.2d 883, 888 (1st Cir.
1954); United States v. Grigalauskas, 195 F.2d 494, 498 (1st Cir. 1952); Trowbridge v. Abra-
sive Co. of Philadelphia, 190 F.2d 825, 830 (3d Cir. 1951); Sunray Oil Corp. v. Allbritton, 188
F.2d 751 (5th Cir. 1951); Covey Gas & Oil Co v. Checketts, 187 F.2d 561, 563 (9th Cir. 1951);
Southern Pac. Co. v. Guthrie, 186 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1951).
State courts have added adjectives but not clarity to this list, e.g., "manifestly excessive"
has been popular in Ohio and Illinois, Toledo, C. & O.R.R. v. Miller, 108 Ohio St. 388, 140
N.E. 617 (1923); Collins v. Sanitary Dist., 270 Ill. 108, 110 N.E. 318 (1915), while "grossly
excessive" seems to be the preferred term in Missouri. Erny v. Revlon Inc., 459 S.W.2d 261
(Mo. 1970); Helming v. Dulle, 441 S.W.2d 351 (Mo. 1969).
An Oregon justice contributed what is probably the most colorful phrase when he de-
scribed the jury award in Van Loin v. Schneiderman, 187 Ore. 89, 210 P.2d 461 (1949), as
"impregnated with evil," apparently because the jury assessed punitive damages equal in
amount to compensatory ones in an assault case. See Lusk, Forty-five Years of Article VII,
Section 3, Constitution of Oregon, 35 ORE. L. REv. 1, 9 (1955). Yet even Justice Lusk, a strong
supporter of unlimited remittitur, acknowledged the difficulty of making such judgments. In
Rust v. Moore-McCormick Lines, Inc., 180 Ore. 409, 435-36, 117 P.2d 429, 441 (1947), he said:
"It is difficult to define the circumstances which warrant exercise of the power [to set aside
excessive verdicts], and we shall not attempt to do so." Another commentator put it more
bluntly: "Thus, we are in the process of arriving at a disturbing conclusion that there is no
sound principle of determining 'excessive' verdicts." Nardi, Excessive Personal Injury
Awards, 1 CLEv.-MAR. L. REv. 23, 33 n.26 (1952).
" See Carlin, supra note 64; Hullverson, Remittitur and Other Things, 28 Mo. B.J. 81
(1972); Nardi, supra note 82; Tongue, In Defense of Juries as Exclusive Judges of the Facts,
35 ORE. L. REV. 143, 188 (1956). See also Note, Constitutional Law-Right to Jury




may be an implicit measuring rod and some tacit agreement about
its use. Yet, as the examination of the Gorsalitz case in the next
subsection will demonstrate, use of such an unstated measure poses
substantial problems of fairness.
C. How the Maximum Is Determined in a Concrete Case:
Gorsalitz
Plaintiff Gorsalitz sued for damages for "extremely severe per-
sonal injuries" sustained while working with electrical equipment
on the defendant chemical corporation's premises." The jury de-
cided the liability issue in plaintiff's favor and awarded him
$1,380,000. Defendant, still contesting the liability issue, moved for
j.n.o.v. and, in the alternative, for a new trial. The district court
judge, finding no fault with the jury's conclusion on liability, re-
jected the j.n.o.v. motion but denied the new trial motion only on
the condition that plaintiff agree to remit $689,367, cutting his re-
covery to $690,633, barely half of the original award.
Both litigants appealed, and the Fifth Circuit upheld the find-
ing of liability as well as the trial court's decision that the jury's
award had exceeded the allowable maximum and that some remitti-
tur was therefore appropriate. However, it concluded that the trial
court had failed to use the maximum recovery rule in fixing the
amount of the remittitur, but instead had substituted its own deter-
mination of what was reasonable. Accordingly, it affirmed in part,
vacated in part, and remanded for a redetermination of the amount
of the remittitur. On remand, the remittitur was reduced to
$492,971, thus increasing the award to $887,029. The plaintiff ap-
pealed a second time and the appellate court once more reduced the
remittitur, but this time by only $2,737, increasing the fourth and
final award to $889,766.
At first glance, these figures would seem to raise more questions
than they answer. How did the appellate court decide that the origi-
nal jury award in this case significantly overshot the allowable max-
imum and that the trial court's first remittitur order significantly
undershot that mysterious mark, whereas its second remittitur
order was almost, but not quite, on target? The court recounts in
some detail its method of computing lost wages to correct the second
order by two thousand dollars, 5 but neither lost wages nor medical
expenses account for the enormous shifts of many hundreds of thou-
" Gorsalitz v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 429 F.2d 1033, 1035 (5th Cir. 1970).
" Gorsalitz v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 456 F.2d 180, 181 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
407 U.S. 921 (1972).
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sands of dollars in the Gorsalitz award.
The big shifts have to do with the amounts awarded for pain
and suffering, and here, to say the least, the court is cryptic. All that
can be gleaned with certainty is this: all three of the official figure-
setters, the jury, the trial court and the appellate court, were in
essential agreement that past and future lost wages slightly ex-
ceeded $200,000, while past and future medical expenses fell some-
what short of $200,000, making a total of approximately $400,000.
All three disagreed sharply on the value of pain and suffering: the
jury thought it was worth $800,000, the trial court first thought it
was worth only $200,000, but when compelled to reconsider, valued
it at about $400,000. The appellate court rejected both the original
jury evaluation and the initial trial court evaluation and, in effect,
accepted the trial court's second approximation of the worth of pain
and suffering.
In valuing pain and suffering, the jury could have been saying
that it was not limited to the value of either medical expenses or
lost wages and that it could, when suffering was severe enough,
exceed the combined total of both. The trial court judge initially
seems to have thought that pain and suffering damages could equal
but not exceed the medical expenses occasioned by the injury. The
appellate court rejected both views and accepted a correction that
set the worth of pain and suffering at an amount roughly equal to
but not in excess of the combined total of medical expenses and lost
wages. If the Fifth Circuit had meant to create a standard for deter-
mining the maximum recovery for pain and suffering based on a
numerical relationship to certain other definable categories of dam-
ages it would not have been difficult for it to say so clearly and
simply, without reliance on adjectives of dubious import. If this
were done, trial court judges would no longer need to struggle with
what one judge has described as "a Solomonic task"86 and still suffer
frequent reversals. Instead, they could simply instruct juries that
they were free to award any amount they thought appropriate for
pain and suffering up to but not in excess of the combined total of
special damages in any personal injury case, perhaps using a similar
rule regarding general damages in some other types of cases as well.
Such a standard would certainly increase clarity in an undenia-
bly murky area, but it would foster the ideal of consistency only in
an abstract mathematical sense. As between individual litigants, it




under the law because it would make the value of pain and suffering
dependent upon the sufferer's salary. The implied standard is thus
unacceptable; perhaps for this reason it has remained unarticu-
lated.
IV. NEW TRIAL ORDERS IN UNLIQUIDATED DAMAGE CASES
Over the last several decades there has been a great expansion
in trial court discretion in the name of flexibility and efficiency.
This trend has created a complementary need to expand the scope
of judicial review in order to minimize the danger of inconsistent or
arbitrary results.8 7 The growth of remittitur review, particularly re-
view of the denial of new trial motions, is one manifestation of this
change. In moving in this direction, with the only authority being
minor hints or a long silence from the Supreme Court, the courts of
appeals seem to be concerned primarily with increasing consistency
across cases and ensuring fairness in individual cases. It seems rea-
sonable to assume that a third motive for this movement is the
desire to preserve the seventh amendment guarantee of a properly
functioning jury that is properly aided in reaching a lawful and
appropriate judgment in each case."8 As noted above, however,
where remittitur itself is improperly, and perhaps unconstitu-
tionally, applied (as to unliquidated damages such as pain and
suffering), appellate review may only add to unfairness and incon-
sistency, without remedying trial court invasions of the jury's func-
tion.
Thus, a paradox emerges: remittitur was used instead of retrial
in the interest of efficiency, but without review, the risk that it
would produce injustice was too high. With review, remittitur may,
as in the Gorsalitz case, become an inefficient process, and the
superiority of the justice produced thereby is open to serious ques-
tion. In a case where there are no standards to guide the award,
''review" is merely the substitution of the subjective opinion of some
judges for the equally subjective opinion of another judge, the only
clear superiority of the former over the latter being the purely hier-
archical one inherent in the structure of the federal judiciary. 8
s' See Wright, supra note 26.
The strongest case for appellate court intervention, of course, is the issuance of remitti-
tur where the jury has determined a level of damages and the trial court seeks to cut that
level back. See Taylor v. Washington Terminal Co., 409 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 835 (1969).
" The history of the Gorsalitz case would belie a recent suggestion that "the simplicity
of the issues involved" and the "clear-cut" standard provided by the maximum recovery rule
will make it easy for circuit courts to deal with appeals against remittiturs and possible for
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Under these circumstances, the safest and most constitution-
ally appropriate guide would seem to be reliance, wherever possible,
on the judgment of the community as a whole. Of course, a single
jury is not an infallible index of community consensus. There may,
in fact, be no community consensus on a particular issue, and, even
when there is, a particular panel of twelve may turn out to be atypi-
cal and unrepresentative."0 When a judge fears that the latter cir-
cumstance has occurred, it is not unreasonable to allow him the
discretion to give a dissatisfied litigant a second chance by granting
a request for a new trial and impanelling a new jury. It also seems
reasonable to allow an appellate court some power of review over the
reasonableness of the trial judge's fears.
At first glance, this argument may seem to raise the specter of
the retrial treadmill. Such need not be the case if one recognizes
that where a second jury reaches essentially the same conclusion as
the first, the odds that there is no community consensus or that both
juries are atypical and unrepresentative of community standards
are infinitely lower-too low, in fact, to require consideration.
Hence, it would seem that there should never be a third trial in such
cases.91 Two juries that arrive at similar conclusions in the same
case provide a clear indication of community consensus, a consensus
that should be honored so long as it does not conflict with an articu-
lated rule of law.9" Although the second award will probably differ
them to dispose of many of these appeals "by a per curiam opinion or no opinion at all, with
relatively little expenditure of judicial time." See DUKE Nora, supra note 9, at 1162.
30 This possibility would be heightened if a single, eccentric juror were to dominate the
decision-making process. However, empirical research makes this possibility appear quite
remote. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 462 (1971).
"' In principle, at least, there is no constitutional obstacle to such a limitation. See
Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Woodson, 134 U.S. 614, 623 (1890), where the Supreme Court
upheld the validity of a Tennessee statute forbidding the granting of more than two new trials
in the same cause on the facts, noting that
[c]ourts rarely grant a new trial after two verdicts upon the facts in favor of the same
party, except for error of law, and the Statute, in the interest of the termination of
litigation, makes that imperative which would otherwise be discretionary .... We can
perceive nothing in the Statute thus applied which amounts to an arbitrary deprivation
of the rights of the citizen, and concur with the Supreme Court of Tennessee that this
Act, which had been in force more than sixty years before the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, was not invalidated by it, while the Fifth Amendment had no application
whatever.
Such a limitation may also help to encourage private settlements: since both parties to
the litigation would know that the second jury verdict on the facts would be final, neither
would be as likely to demand retrial lightly. Conversely, knowing that he may have an
unlimited number of chances to score an extreme victory over the other party may encourage
a grimly determined plaintiff or defendant to reject all reasonable settlement possibilities,
thus increasing the burden on the courts as well as on the other litigant in such a case.
11 Recent re-emphasis on the desirability of judicial detacliment and restraint may be
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from the first to some extent, neither party has grounds for com-
plaint since, by definition, the second award falls within the range
of reasonable jury awards.
Suppose, though, that the second jury award differs from the
first; that it is not merely a bit higher or lower but significantly
above or below the first. Can it still be said to reflect the conscience
of the community? Here, the problem becomes more complex be-
cause, logically, there are three possible explanations for the diver-
gence of the two juries: (1) it may accurately reflect the division and
lack of consensus in society on a particular issue, or (2) it may be a
function of the atypicality of the first jury, or (3) it may be a func-
tion of the atypicality of the second jury.
The first of these possibilities has the highest probability of
being true because the odds that a consensus reached by any fairly
selected panel of twelve jurors represents an atypical judgment are
low-that is the very assumption on which the jury system is based.
Thus, both juries are probably representative, and the divergence
between them is likely to be an accurate reflection of a lack of
consensus in society, a division foreshadowed by the initial disagree-
ment between judge and jury that caused the judge to order a sec-
ond trial. This being the case, no purpose would be served by bur-
dening the judiciary and the litigants with further trials only to
obtain further discrepant results.
If we assume, however, that a consensus does exist in society
and that one of the two juries therefore was atypical, a third trial
might indicate which of the two awards was the representative one.
The probability that the third award will come out reasonably close
to whichever is the "typical" award depends on the degree of con-
sensus in the society. Where there is little consensus, a third trial
would be little help in constructing a range within which the major-
ity of awards would fall-by definition, the "reasonable" range of
awards; three trials would be far too small a sampling to yield a
statistically reliable result.
In personal injury cases where the unliquidated damage ele-
ment of pain and suffering arises, there is usually little, if any,
consensus in society. If there were such a consensus, it would be
reasonable to expect it to be expressed in an articulable standard
for calculating damages; serious disagreement between judges and
jury and between trial and appellate judges, such as that in the
relevant in this context. See, e.g., Kurland, The Appointment and Disappointment of Su-
preme Court Justices, 2 LAW & Soc. ORDER 183 (1972).
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Gorsalitz case, would be wholly unexpected. Under these circum-
stances, holding a third new trial, in order to find the "right" award,
would be fruitless.
CONCLUSION
As this comment has argued, remittitur and remittitur review
should not be dealt with in a unitary fashion, to be applied to all
cases or to none. Rather, to retain the efficiency advantages of re-
mittitur while preserving the parties' seventh amendment rights, it
is necessary to distinguish between those cases in which there are
liquidated damages or where clear rules of law apply and those
cases, typically personal injury cases, in which damages are unliqui-
dated and no standard exists for measuring them. In the first type
of case, where damages are liquidated or clear rules of law apply,
ordering a conditional remittitur seems fully consistent with the
seventh amendment because what is being examined is a question
of law and not of fact. Here, there seems to be no constitutional
obstacle to review of either a remittitur accepted under protest or
the refusal to order remittitur or retrial. Existing procedural obsta-
cles to these practices seem less than compelling, in logic and in
practice, and should be abolished. In the second type of case, where
damages are unliquidated and no clear rules of law apply, this
comment has argued that remittitur is an unconstitutional practice.
The trial judge would retain his discretion to order a new trial when
he suspected that an award was excessive. The comment has sug-
gested, however, that the judge should limit himself to ordering only
one retrial, since a third trial would not improve the quality of the
result, but-would increase the inefficiency of the system. Following
the final judgment rule, this new trial determination would be re-
viewable for an abuse of discretion after a final judgment had been
rendered in the second trial.
Barbara Lerner
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